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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-2234 
 ___________ 
 
 JOHN BRANDT, 
        Appellant 
 v. 
 
ELIZABETH BURNS; HEIDI CAMERLENGO; LOUIS MARTELLI 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 1:07-cv-00862) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Noel L. Hillman 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 1, 2011 
 Before:  SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  August 3, 2011)   
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
  John Brandt, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order 
granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment in his action alleging due process 
violations and claims under New Jersey state law.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm. 
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I. 
  In 2003, the New Jersey Superior Court found Brandt not guilty by reason 
of insanity with respect to charges of criminal mischief and other offenses.  As a result, 
Brandt was involuntarily committed pursuant to State v. Krol, 344 A.2d 289 (N.J. 1975), 
and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:4-8.1
  At the time of his transfer to Ancora, Brandt was subject to an unrelated, 
outstanding warrant for his arrest in Lakewood Township, Ocean County, New Jersey, 
for unpaid traffic fines.  Brandt told his treatment team that he wished to be transferred to 
jail on detainer status — ostensibly to satisfy those unpaid fines — and threatened to 
escape from Ancora if he did not get his way.
  After spending time at Ann Klein Forensic Center and 
Greystone Psychiatric Hospital, Brandt was transferred to Ancora Psychiatric Hospital 
(“Ancora”) in Hammonton, Atlantic County, New Jersey, in September 2005.  His 
treatment team at Ancora included Dr. Elizabeth Burns, Dr. Heidi Camerlengo, and Louis 
Martelli — Brandt’s psychiatrist, psychologist, and social worker, respectively. 
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1 Under New Jersey law, “[a]n acquittal by reason of insanity terminates the criminal 
proceedings against an accused, unless the accused remains mentally ill and in need of 
involuntary commitment,” in which case the individual can be involuntary committed.  In 
re Commitment of W.K., 731 A.2d 482, 483 (N.J. 1999).  After a defendant is committed, 
“periodic review hearings (Krol hearings) are held in a criminal proceeding on notice to 
the prosecutor to determine if continued involuntary commitment is warranted.”  Id. 
 
2 Brandt had previously escaped from Greystone Psychiatric Hospital on two separate 
occasions.  
  The treatment team ultimately agreed to 
this transfer.  To ensure that Brandt would remain detained after the outstanding warrant 
was resolved, the treatment team obtained an order from Brandt’s Krol judge.  That 
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order, dated November 9, 2005, stated that Brandt was subject to a detainer, and directed 
“any law enforcement officer” to “immediately arrest this Defendant and produce the 
Defendant before the Court or hold in custody until the next regular Court session.”     
  On November 18, 2005, Brandt was transferred from Ancora to the 
Lakewood Township police station.  A 30-day supply of medication and a detailed 
discharge report prepared by Dr. Burns were sent with him.3
  Upon his release, Brandt took a bus to his home.  Three days later, he and 
his friends spent time in Pemberton, New Jersey.  When all of his friends had left, Brandt 
approached two strangers and offered them money to give him a ride home.  The two 
individuals agreed, but instead of driving him home, they drove to a different location.  
During this drive, Brandt noticed that one of the individuals was carrying a gun.  
Thinking that this individual was going to shoot or rob him, Brandt grabbed the gun.  A 
shot then went off, with the bullet striking Brandt’s right knee.  Brandt then exited the car 
and threw his money to the ground.  The individual with the gun picked up the money 
and left.  Brandt, meanwhile, was treated at a hospital for his injured knee and was later 
returned to Ancora. 
  Once at the police station, 
Brandt paid the outstanding traffic fines.  The police then ran a background check to 
determine whether there were any remaining warrants outstanding.  Finding none —  it 
appears that the Krol judge’s order had not been properly distributed — the police 
released Brandt. 
                                                 
3 The discharge report noted, inter alia, that Brandt was “still under KROL status.”  
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  In February 2007, Brandt filed a pro se complaint in the District Court 
against Dr. Burns, Dr. Camerlengo, and Martelli.  Brandt subsequently amended the 
complaint, and, in July 2009, filed a second amended complaint through counsel.  The 
second amended complaint alleged that the three defendants had violated his due process 
rights, as well as his rights under New Jersey state law, by improperly discharging him 
and failing to provide for his continued care and treatment.  Brandt claimed that, as a 
result of the defendants’ conduct, he had been mugged and shot. 
  In the months that followed, Dr. Burns moved to dismiss a subset of the 
claims against her, all three defendants collectively moved for summary judgment, and 
Brandt cross-moved for partial summary judgment.  On March 31, 2010, the District 
Court entered an order granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, denying 
Brandt’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment, and denying Dr. Burns’ motion to 
dismiss as moot.  In doing so, the court concluded that all of Brandt’s claims failed 
because a superseding cause broke the causal link between the defendants’ alleged 
conduct and the harm he suffered:  
[E]ven assuming that Dr. Burns breached her duty of care as a 
clinical psychiatrist by discharging plaintiff into the hands of 
the Lakewood Township police, and all defendants deprived 
plaintiff of his substantive right to medical care and 
protection, and did not follow the proper procedures in 
discharging plaintiff, defendants cannot be liable for 
plaintiff’s injuries because the harm plaintiff encountered was 
caused by a superseding act. 
 
. . . . 
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. . . Dr. Burns and the other treatment team members believed 
that when plaintiff was discharged from Ancora, appropriate 
measures were in place to ensure that plaintiff would not be 
released into the community.  Further, they believed that the 
legal system, over which they had no control, would properly 
effectuate their plan.  It is beyond the contemplation of 
mental health professionals, however, that [the Krol judge’s] 
order would not be properly disseminated so that the 
Lakewood Township police department would not be alerted 
to it, and therefore fail to retain plaintiff pursuant to it.   
 
(Dist. Ct. Op. 10, 14-15.) 
  Brandt now seeks review of the District Court’s judgment.            
II.       
  We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We 
review a district court’s grant of summary judgment under a plenary standard, applying 
the same test employed by the District Court.”  Smith v. Borough of Dunmore, 633 F.3d 
176, 179 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Summary 
judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(a).  “A court reviewing a summary judgment motion must evaluate the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that 
party’s favor.”  EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010). 
  As the District Court noted, tort law principles, including the principle of 
proximate causation, govern not only Brandt’s state law claims, but also his constitutional 
claims.  See Egervary v. Young, 366 F.3d 238, 246 (3d Cir. 2004).  Proximate causation 
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is established where the defendant’s wrongful conduct is a “substantial factor” in 
bringing about harm to the plaintiff.  See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS  
§ 431 (1965)); see also Verdicchio v. Ricca, 843 A.2d 1042, 1056 (N.J. 2004) (noting 
that the New Jersey courts have adopted the “substantial factor” test).  The chain of 
proximate causation is broken, however, by a superseding cause.  Lamont v. New Jersey, 
637 F.3d 177, 185 (3d Cir. 2011).  “A superseding cause is an event or conduct 
sufficiently unrelated to or unanticipated by a defendant that warrants termination of 
liability, irrespective of whether the defendant’s negligence was or was not a substantial 
factor in bringing about the harm.”  Thabault v. Chait, 541 F.3d 512, 525 (3d Cir. 2008).               
  Although the issue of proximate causation is typically determined by the 
factfinder, this issue may be addressed as a matter of law “where the outcome is clear or 
when highly extraordinary events or conduct takes place.”  See id. at 523-24; see also 
Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J. v. Arcadian Corp, 189 F.3d 305, 318 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The 
New Jersey courts have on many occasions held that proximate causation did not exist as 
a matter of law.”).  Having reviewed the record in this case, we agree with the District 
Court that it was appropriate to resolve the issue of proximate causation as a matter of 
law.  Moreover, for substantially the reasons provided by the District Court, we agree that 
the apparent mishandling of the Krol judge’s order (by an actor or actors outside of the 
Appellees’ control) and the subsequent release of Brandt by the Lakewood Township 
police constituted a superseding cause that broke the causal link between the Appellees’ 
alleged conduct and the harm suffered by Brandt.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
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District Court’s judgment.  Brandt’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on 
appeal is denied as unnecessary, as his IFP status from the District Court proceedings 
carries over to this appeal.4
                                                 
4  The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (“PLRA”) fee payment provisions, see 28 U.S.C. § 
1915, do not apply here, for Brandt is not a “prisoner” as defined in  
§ 1915(h).  See Kolocotronis v. Morgan, 247 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 2001) (concluding 
that litigant who was committed to a psychiatric facility following verdict of not guilty by 
reason of insanity is not a “prisoner” under § 1915(h), and thus “not subject to the 
detailed inmate-account procedures of § 1915”).   
  See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3).  Brandt’s motion for 
appointment of counsel and request for transcripts are denied. 
 
